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Abstract
Proebstings Paradox is an argument that appears to show that the
betting rule known as the Kelly criterion can lead a bettor to risk an
arbitrarily high proportion of his wealth on the outcome of a single event.
. In this paper I show that a large class of betting criteria, including
fractional Kelly, also su¤er from the same shortcoming and use standard
tools from microeconomic theory to explain why this is so. I also derive a
new criterion, dubbed the doubly conservative criterion, that is immune to
the problem identied above. Immunity stems from the bettors attitudes
towards capital preservation and from him becoming rapidly pessimistic
about his chances of winning the better odds he is o¤ered.
1 Introduction
Proebstings Paradox is an argument that appears to show that the betting
rule known as the Kelly criterion can lead a bettor to risk an arbitrarily high
proportion of his wealth on the outcome of a single event. According to this
criterion one ought to choose the size of ones bet so as to maximize the expected
growth of ones wealth. Addressing the paradox is important in that it seems
to contradict the well known fact that a bettor that follows the Kelly criterion
can never be ruined absolutely (capital equal zero) or asymptotically (capital
tends to zero with positive probability). The paradox was rst communicated
by Todd Proebsting to Ed Thorp by email, who in turn made it publicly known
in an article in the September 2008 issue of Wilmott Magazine, a magazine that
serves the quantitative nance community.
In this paper I o¤er some bad news and some good newsfor the proponents
of the Kelly criterion. The bad news is that the problem is worse than what
Proebsting and Thorp anticipated in that one can devise a sequence of structured
bets that a Kelly bettor would willingly accept that would entice the investor
to risk virtually his entire wealth and that will keep the expected growth of his
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wealth as close to zero as one wishes. I also show that the so-called fractional
Kelly criterion (a criterion that follows from betting only a constant fraction of
what the Kelly criterion would dictate) is also vulnerable in the same way.1
The "good news" is that the ndings of Proebsting and Thorp, and the
generalizations shown below, cannot be used to argue against the use of the
Kelly criterion because many other betting criteria2 also su¤er from exactly
the same shortcomings. Something deeper is generating these vulnerabilities,
and in the paper I discuss what that is: the simple fact that, embedded in most
reasonable betting systems one can devise lies the maxim "Good odds are worth
paying for." Once this is in place, a version of the skimming result described
above basically goes through.3
There are exceptions, however: bettors that would very rapidly become pes-
simistic about their chances of winning the better odds they are o¤ered. In the
paper I show the existence of a family of betting rules with these characteristics
(all distant cousinsof fractional Kelly). This family is somewhat immune to
the skimming result in that there is a limit to how much those bettors will bet
no matter how attractive the odds in any sequence of bets presented to them
may be. This provides a half open door4 out of the dismal world Proebsting
and Thorp discovered exists for bettors who like betting, and from which they
would nd hard to escape. On that less pessimistic note, the paper ends.
The rest of the paper is devoted to a coherent presentation of the claims made
above, together with additional commentary that would aid in the interpretation
of what lies beneath Proebstings paradox and its variants. In the concluding
section I also informally discuss the implications of the results presented to
issues related to security design, mutual fund marketing, and plain vanilla
betting.
One more thing. In coming up with the results in the paper I relied heavily
on some standard tools from microeconomic theory.5 I have nevertheless kept
the economics jargon to a minimum in the body of the article and relegated the
kinds of details that would only be of interest to economists to the endnotes.
Just for kicks, bettors will be regarded as male while bookies will be regarded
as female.
2 The Paradox6
Suppose that you believe an event will occur with 50% probability and somebody
o¤ers you 2 to 1 odds on that event. How much money you should place on
this bet depends on how you feel about the tradeo¤ between risk and reward
that is being o¤ered to you. If you were neutral to risk and all you cared
about was the expected nal value of wealth, then you would place 100% of
your wealth on the gamble, and you would ignore the fact that you may end up
losing everything with probability 50%. The Kelly criterion would have you be
much more conservative than that in that it would instead have you focus on
the expected growth rate of your wealth. In the case in which you are o¤ered
the 2 to 1 odds (I will call this "Situation A"), the task is to nd the fraction
2
fA of your wealth that solves the problem
1 1
max ln(W   fW ) + ln (W + 2fW ) ;
f 2 2
which yields fA = :25 and exposes you to a far lower risk7 than if you place all
your money on the bet. More generally, if youre o¤ered a 50/50 bet that pays
b to 1 the Kelly criterion would have you bet a fraction of your wealth equal to
f = b 1 : Hence, if you were o¤ered 5 to 1 odds ("Situation B2b ") according to
the Kelly criterion you would place fB = 40% on your wealth on the bet.
Now, suppose that these bets occur in sequence. Youre o¤ered 2 to 1 odds,
bet 25% of your wealth and then are o¤ered 5 to 1 odds ("Situation C"). Should
you place an additional bet and, if so, how much?
The Kelly criterion will indeed have you place an additional bet, which can
be computed as follows:
1 1
max ln(W   :25W   fW ) + ln (W + 2 :
f 2 2
 25W + 5fW )
which yields f = :225.
The paradox is that the total bet in this situation, fC = 0:25+0:225 = 0:475,
is larger than the 0:4 Kelly fraction if the 5 to 1 odds are o¤ered from the
beginning. It is counterintuitive that you bet more when some of the bet is at
unfavorable odds.8 Todd Proebsting emailed Ed Thorp asking about this.9
Moreover, Thorp showed that if a gambler is o¤ered 2 to 1 odds, then 4 to 1,
then 8 to 1, and so on, the Kelly criterion would have you eventually bet your
entire wealth, thus exposing the bettor to a risk of complete ruin of exactly 50%,
just as if he was risk neutral. This appears to challenge the view commonly held
of the Kelly criterion keeping the investor away from any risk of ruin.
3 The resolution
3.1 "The bettor bets more at blended 2 to 1 and 5 to 1
odds than at 5 to 1 odds"
While it is correct that the bettor is facing blended (average) 2 to 1 and 5 to
1 in situation C, what matters, for the purpose of decision making is not the
average odds but the marginal odds. The odds that a bettor faces determine
the rate at which the individual can sacrice money-in-the-event-of-losing to
money-in-the-event-of-winning. In particular, when the bettor is o¤ered 5 to 1
odds he can sacrice one dollar when losing in exchange for ve dollars when
winning. The fact that the bettor already made bets at 2 to 1 odds does not
alter the terms of the current 5 to 1 tradeo¤. What it does alter is the cash value
of the bettors wealth. This is so because individuals can now get better bets
for the same cost or, equivalently, comparable bets at a lower cost than the one
the bettor is now sitting on. Thus, the 2 to 1 bet will trade at a discount in an
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environment in which 5 to 1 bets are freely available. It is thus more accurate to
say that in this situation the bettor faces the same (marginal) odds in situations
C and B but is poorer in situation C relative to situation B, and thats what
explains the di¤erent choices in both situations. One can estimate the change
in the real value of the bettors wealth as follows: Before the individual makes
any bet at 2 to 1 odds the individuals wealth is, say, W , all in cash. Given
these odds a Kelly bettor places a bet of :25W . Now consider the e¤ect of the
change in odds on the (market) value of this bet. The question is: how much
cash does one have to sacrice to obtain, at the current 5 to 1 odds, a bet that
pays 2 when winning and  1 when losing? The answer is the value of v that
satises
(2  v) + 5 ( 1  v) = 0;
that is, the value that makes the 2 to 1 bet as attractive as the newly o¤ered
5 to 1 bets, or v =  :5.10 In other words, committing to a :25W bet and then
seeing the odds improve to 5 to 1 is equivalent to not having committed to any
bet at 2 to 1, having ones wealth change by  :5  :25W =  :125W and then
facing 5 to 1 odds. In general, if a bettor makes the bet fA on a bet with a
payout of bA, and then is o¤ered bB > bA; the marked-to-market wealth WC
can be computed as follows:
C 1 + bW = W;
1 + bB
where b = fAbA + (1   fA)bB is the blended (weighted average of) odds.11
In the example above, the blended odds are b = 4:25 and thus WC = :875W:
Based on an argument along the lines of what was espoused above, Aaron
Brown (in a personal communication to Ed Thorp about this paradox) argued
that this analysis "makes it clear that the change in behavior [of the Kelly
bettor] results from the mark-to-market loss the investor experiences when the
new payout is o¤ered." While this is absolutely correct it does not yet o¤er
an explanation for why the mark-to-market loss makes the bettor bet more in
situation C than in situation B. In particular, the mark-to market loss could
have enticed the bettor to bet less. Why is this not the case?
3.1.1 Wealth e¤ects of a change in odds
It turns out that a consideration of an elementary fact is an important compo-
nent of the full explanation as for why the Kelly bettor bets more in situation
C than in situation B: that the individual does not have a direct use for the
bet itself, but, rather, for the outcomes that arise from betting. In other words,
consider
1 1
max ln(W fW ) + ln (W + bfW ) ;
f 2
 
2
with solution f = b 1 :2b What contributes to the expected growth rate is not
f directly but rather the nal value of wealth in both states of nature, namely,
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W   fW when losing and W + bfW when winning. Call those wealth levels
x1 and x

2, respectively. It follows that
W (1 + b) W (1 + b)
x1 = ; x

2 =2b 2
and so it is clear that x1 and x

2 vary directly with W ,
12 which is to say that,
other things equal, as the individual becomes poorer (W drops) he adjusts his
possible wealth levels x1 and x

2 downwards, and in this case in proportion to
the decrease in W . Think of x1 as the dollar amount of wealth the individual
keeps in cash. It is important to understand why x1 drops with a decrease in
W . At the margin, the last dollar allocated to x1 and x

2 contribute equally
to the expected growth of wealth of the individual. Of course, the balance one
strikes is to keep x2 high so that ones wealth is high when one wins but to keep
x1 also high so that ones wealth is not too low when one loses. If wealth were
to drop to, say, level W < W but the value of x1 were to stay at x1 this could
only be achieved by substantially reducing the dollar amount the individual bets
and thus reducing greatly the possible value of wealth when one wins, x2. At
that point the risk/reward tradeo¤ is such that increasing ones bet by $1, thus
reducing the value of x1, would cost less in terms of growth rate in the event
of losing than the growth rate that one gains from betting more in the event of
winning.13
The reason why this is signicant is that it was established above that the
only di¤erence between Situations C and B is that the marked-to-market wealth
level of the individual is lower in Situation C than in Situation B and thus
xC1 < x
B
1 (and x
C
2 < x
B
2 ). Therefore, if we wish to ask, as we did before,
what fraction of the original wealth W does the individual bet in Situation C
C
one would have to compute fC W x= 1W and one immediately concludes that
fC > fB . This conclusion can be reached also from looking at the expression
fC
WC
= fB
WC
+ 1 1;
W

 
W

which says that fC is a weighted average between fB and one, where the
weight placed on fB is the ratio of the marked-to-market wealth to the original
wealth.14 In our example above;
fC
WC
= fB +

WC
1 

= :875
W W
 :4 + :125 = :475;
as before.
To summarize, the full answer to the question "why does the individual bet
a higher fraction of W at fC than at fB even though he faces worse (blended)
odds at C than at B?" is as follows:
While average odds are worse at C than at B, whats important for the
purpose of decision making is the marginal odds, and those are the same in both
situations. After the individual bets at the original odds, bA, his portfolio can
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take the values
 
1  fAW and W  1 + bAfA with equal probability. Once the
individual is o¤ered the better odds, bB, the cash value of his wealth drops to
1+b W;1+b which makes the contribution of an extra dollar of betting towards the
expe
B
cted growth rate of wealth larger than before, thus enticing the individual to
chase some of that growth by reducing his cash levels at C relative to those held
at B and thus betting more at C than at B.
4 A general phenomenon
While not negating the known optimality properties of the Kelly criterion the
discussion of Proebstings Paradox so far appears to suggest that this criterion
leaves the bettor at risk of losing a substantial fraction of his wealth to a bookie
(or a series of bookies) that would o¤er the bettor a string of bets of increasingly
favorable odds. In this section I show that, to the extent that this is so, this is
also true not just for the Kelly criterion but for a wide variety of betting criteria,
including fractional Kelly (the practice of betting a constant fraction of what a
Kelly bettor would choose in any given situation).
Consider rst the class of rules that arise as the solution to
1 1
max u(W f
f 2
  W ) + u (W + bfW ) ;
2
where u is increasing, twice contiuously di¤erentiable, and strictly concave. Let
fu (W; b) be the solution to this problem.15 Now let us apply this decision rule
in situations A, B and C as above, so fA = fu (W; 2) ; fB = fu (W; 5) ; and
fC = fA + f; where f solves
1 1
max u(W   fAW   fW ) + u  W + 2fAW + 5fW :
f 2 2
The question is: how does fC compare to fB?

Claim 1 fC > fB :
Proof. First dene, as before, x1 = W   fW and x2 = W + bfW and thus
rewrite the problem as
1 1
max u(x1) + u (x2)
x1;x2 2 2
b 1
subject to x1 + x2 =W;
1 + b 1 + b
with solution x W x
C
1 = x1 (W; b) ; x
 x1 (W; b) :To show fC1 = =
  1 > fB =W
W xB1 xW one can focus on the comparison between
C
1 and x
B
1 : In situation C the
bettor faces the same marginal odds as he faces in situation B, but with the
bettor being poorer at C. Hence, xB1 = x1 (W; 5) and x
C
1 = x1
 
WC ; 5

with
WC
1 + b
= W;
1 + bB
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where b = fAbA + (1 fA)bB and therefore WC < W . Hence, if we can show
that @x1(W;b)
 
> 0 then it follows that xC <@W 1 x
B
1 and hence f
C > fB : This turns
out to be so.16
5 Fractional Kelly
As mentioned above, the fractional Kelly criterion would have you bet a fraction
of what a Kelly bettor would bet in any given situation and so it can be simply
be described as cf for some constant c between zero and one, where f is the
full Kelly fraction. Fractional Kelly, it is said, can protect the bettor from having
an incorrect statistical model of the situation at hand. Can this be formalized?
In the traditional analysis of betting in which the Kelly criterion is developed
there is an implicit assumption: that the odds o¤ered to the bettor contain no
information about whether one will win or lose the wager. It is not unreason-
able, however, to assume that the bettors beliefs may vary with the odds the
bookie o¤ers. For example, the bettor could wonder whether the bookie knows
something he doesnt. After all, what else could explain him being o¤ered such
good odds? Let q be the probability the bettor places on an event taking place
before he is o¤ered any kind of bet. The bookie now o¤ers the bettor odds b to
1 (b > 1). The Kelly bettor nds f to solve
max (1  q) ln(W   fW ) + q ln (W + bfW ) :
f
However, another bettor may revise his beliefs based upon the odds being o¤ered
to him. Let c be a constant between zero and one that represents his condence
in his own probabilistic estimate and let qc = cq + (1  c) 1 :1+b This cautious
bettor would pick f to solve
max (1  qc) ln(W
f
  fW ) + qc ln (W + bfW ) :
The interpretation is that the bettor believes his chances of winning are worse
the better the odds he is o¤ered. Were he to have no condence on his own es-
timate he would basically conclude that his probability of winning when o¤ered
b to 1 odds is 11+b and he would thus bet absolutely nothing.
My point here is not in the least to defend this model of belief revision. Just
to indicate that this model characterizes the fractional Kelly criterion in this
situation.
Claim 2 The solution fc to the cautious bettor problem is cf; where f is the
full Kelly fraction for odds b and beliefs q.
Proof. Consider the bet of an ordinary Kelly bettor who, for whatever reason,
has beliefs over winning given by qc. This bettor would bet a fraction of his
wealth given by q
c(1+b) 1 :b Now to gure out what a cautious bettor would do
simply consider this solution and replace qc by cq + (1  c) 1 :1+b This yields
q(1+b)fc = c
 1 = cfb
:
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5.1 Proebstings Paradox and fractional Kelly
An advantage of this representation is that it provides a context in which we can
understand how a fractional Kelly bettor would behave in situations A, B and C
as above. Consider, for example, c = :5 so fAc = :125 and f
B
c = :2: What about
situation C, our case with "blended odds"? Is it still so that fCc > f
B
c ? Its not
even clear how to apply fractional Kelly without an appeal to a representation
such as the one found above. Thanks to it I can write the problem the fractional
Kelly bettor faces as
max (1  qc) ln(W   :125W   fW ) + qc ln (W + 2 :125W + 5fW )
f
subject to qc
1
= :5q + :5
1 + 5
with q = 1 and solution f = :125. Hence, fC =2 c :125 + :125 = :25 >= :2 =
fBc :
17
6 What is going on?
We have seen that for all the bettors that we have considered we get that
fC > fB and are therefore vulnerable to continuing to increase their exposure
to risk were they o¤ered a string of bets of increasingly favorable odds. Why
would that be so? In this Section I provide an explanation for this.
What is important to recognize is that, even though bettors do not have a
direct use for the bet itself, they value betting in light of the consequences that
arise from the bet. The value of a particular bet for an individual can thus
be inferred from studying the criteria the individual uses for placing their bets.
In particular, it turns out to be true for all of the bettors considered in this
paper that the rst few dollars of betting are much more valuable to the bettor
than the subsequent dollars of betting.18 Thus, a clever bookie will recognize
this fact and attempt to place di¤erent bets with the bettor at di¤erent odds,
depending on what the bookie perceives the value of the subsequent bets is to
the bettor.19 In principle, the bookie can extract all of the value the bettor
derives from betting in this way and the bettor will likely end up betting more
than if he was simply o¤ered the most favorable odds from the string of bets
in the rst place. I will call bets of this kind structured bets and, for xed
wealth W , describe them by a function R(f) dened over the interval [0; 1] with
the following interpretation: when the bettor bets fW dollars he gets a reward
equal to R(f)W dollars in the event of winning. Clearly, ordinary bets t this
formalism: in that case, R(f) = b  f; with b being the constant odds o¤ered.
6.1 Skimming the Kelly bettor
Theorem 3 Consider an event that the bettor believes has a probability of oc-
curring equal to 1 . For any f 2 1 ; 1 2 2 and any (small) > 0 there is a structured
  
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bet R(f) such that the Kelly bettor bets a fraction f of his wealth given those
odds and the expected growth rate of his wealth is :
Proof. I will consider bets of the form
1 f1 f
R (f) =
(
 
1 f
1 f
with
b b+ bf   fb
if f  f
otherwise
b
b =

e
1  f
2
and
fb= f     pe21   1  f :
e
The idea behind this bet is as follows: it o¤ers better and better odds the
more money the bettor wagers, up to f  f: Past that point it o¤ers even higher
(but constant) odds, given by b, on any bets placed in excess of f .
The problem for the bettor is then to
b
1 1
b
max ln(W f
f
  W ) + ln (W +R (f)W )
2 2
subject to R(f) as given above. First lets show that the expected growth of
the bettors wealth when betting f is indeed  :
1 1 f
ln(W   fW ) + ln
2 2
 
W +
 
1
b b+ b ff

  f
 
b!W!  lnW
1 1 f
= ln(1
2
  f) + ln 1 + + b f f
2
  
1 
b
f

 
!!
but
b b
fb fe
+ b
 p
f fb =    

1
1 
  
2 
fb   1  f
e2
p
=
  1
   f e   1p  e+    e2
e2
  1  e
1 
  +  f
f e

 +
    1 1 

p
2
 f
2
and hence
     e + e   1p
e2   1 e=  1  f   1
1 1 e2
ln(1  f) + ln
 
1 +
2 2 1  f   1
!
= :
Now notice that the expected growth rate
 
of the

bettors wealth for f  fb is
zero:
1 1 f 1 1 f
ln(W fW )+ ln

W + W
1  f

 lnW = ln(1 f)+ ln 1 + = 0:
2 2 2
 
2

1  f

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This means that f = f dominates any f  f: Based on this the problem can now
be recast as max 1f ln(W f2   fW ) + 1 ln W + 1 f + b f W ;2  f
es
 b 
1
b   
after some simplications, reduc to
b b  which,
1 1
max ln(1
f 2
  f) + ln
2
 
1  2f + f ;
a problem that has the desired solution solution f = f .
Remark 1 The condition f > 12 is used to guarantee that f > 0. The result is
still true, and easier to prove, for smaller values of f (in those cases one may
have to o¤er the better odds rst, or o¤er simple, linear, odds)
b
. I dont discuss
those cases in the paper as they are not as interesting as the situations in which
f can be made to be as large as desired. Similar considerations apply to  being
"small."
6.2 Skimming the general bettor
A result analogous to the one just shown can be derived for bettors who seek
to maximize
1 1
max u(W
r 2
  r) + u (W + br) ;
2
as in Section 4 above, where r 2 [0;W ]. For any such bettor with wealth W one
can determine the certainty equivalent of his random wealth (W   r;W + br)
as the cash value CE that makes the bettor indi¤erent between the random
wealth and the cash, namely, CE is the solution to
1 1
u(W   r) + u (W + br) = u (CE) :
2 2
Any such bettor can be thus said to seek to maximize the certainty equivalent
of his random wealth. I will call those bettors theCEbettors.
The Kelly skimming result has the bettor subjected to an arbitrarily low
growth rate of his wealth. In the case of the CE bettor I will consider the
bettor skimmed when the certainty equivalent of the bettors random wealth
is arbitrarily close to the bettors initial wealth, thus not much value has been
generated for the bettor from the prospect of betting, even as the bettor willingly
hands the bookie a large fraction of his weath.20
Theorem 4 Consider an event that the CE bettor believes has a probability
of occurring equal to 12 . For any r 2 (0;W ) and any (small)  > 0 there is
a structured bet R(r) such that the CE bettor with wealth W bets r and the
certainty equivalent of his portfolio is W + :
Proof. The structure of the proof is identical to the one above. See Appendix
CE for the details.
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6.3 Skimming the Fractional Kelly Bettor
Skimming the fractional Kelly bettor is harder than skimming an ordinary Kelly
bettor since as one improves the odds o¤ered to the fractional Kelly bettor he
becomes more pessimistic about the likelihood of winning the bet. One thus
has to o¤er more attractive odds to this bettor to entice him to give the bookie
just about all his wealth. It can still be done, as I show below.
Before I proceed in showing the desired result a modeling choice has to be
made. It was shown in Section 5 that a fractional Kelly bettor is like an ordinary
Kelly bettor except for that he becomes more pessimistic about his chances of
winning the more favorable the odds he is o¤ered. In understanding how the
fractional Kelly bettor behaves in the face of varying odds one must ask the
question: which odds drive the behavior of the bettors beliefs: marginal odds
or average odds? I will bias the setup against being able to prove the skimming
result I seek by assuming that the beliefs of the bettor are the most pessimistic
given the schedule of odds o¤ered. In other words: they will be driven by the
highest marginal odds that the bettor faces.21 As a general rule, this protects
the bettor vis a vis the behavior of the ordinary Kelly bettor by reducing the
desired amount the fractional Kelly bettor will wish to bet for any given set
of odds and initial beliefs q. Again, the bettors problem when he faces simple
(linear) odds is to
max (1  qc) ln(W   fW ) + qc ln (W + bfW )
f
subject to qc = cq + (1  c) 1 :1+b In our case, in the face of the structured bet
R(f), the problem becomes
max (1  qc) ln(W   fW ) + qc ln (W +R (f)W )
f
subject to qc = cq+(1  c) 1 ; where b=supf R0 (f) : For this denition to make1+b
sense I only require for R (f) to be di¤erentiable over some interval I  (0; 1)
and for b < 1. Alternatively, that one has a way to determine what are the
best incremental odds o¤ered as part of the structured bet R. These are very
weak assumptions.
Theorem 5 Consider an event that the fractional Kelly bettor believes has a
prior probability of occurring equal to 12
estimate given by c. For any f 2   1 ; 12 and who places a condence in hisand any (small)  > 0 there is a
structured bet Rc(f) such that the fractional Kelly bettor bets a fraction f of his
wealth given those odds and the expected growth rate of his wealth is :
For proof see Appendix FC.
Remark 2 All the results in this paper have had as starting point prior proba-
bilities of an event ocurring equal to 1 :2 This is without loss of generalty. Altering
this number to some arbitrary number between zero and one yields essentially
the same results, for suitably modied choice of odds to be o¤ered to the bettor.
This will also be true for the result that follows.
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7 Door Half Open
What allows the fractional Kelly bettor to be skimmed in the same way that
the full Kelly bettor is skimmed is the fact that, no matter how good the odds
o¤ered to the bettor are, he keeps a certain amount of optimism regarding the
chances of the event in question actually taking place. In other words: even as
the probability of the event taking place that is implied by the odds goes to zero
the fractional Kellys posterior beliefs remain bounded away from zero, as they
approach cq from above. This does suggest a variation on the fractional Kelly
criterion that would allow the implied probabilities and the posterior beliefs
to converge together as the odds improve. Consider the beliefs q of an event
occurring dened as follows:
1 1
q = h (b; q) ; for q  and b
2

q
  1;
where h is onto, decreasing in b and increasing in q:22 Moreover, h has the
following properties: 
1 1
h (b; q) 2 ; q
1 + b

for b >
q
  1
1
lim h (b; q) = lim = 0
b!1 b!1 1 + b
lim h (b; q) = q
b# 1q 1
The interpretation is as follows: q represents the bettors prior beliefs and q
represent the posterior beliefs conditional on the odds, b. As the beliefs implied
by the odds o¤ered to the bettor get close to the prior beliefs of the bettor, the
posterior beliefs are also close to the prior beliefs. Also, as the beliefs implied by
the odds go to zero the posterior beliefs of the bettor go to zero as well. More is
needed, though: it is necessary for q to eventually approach zero at a su¢ ciently
fast rate. A su¢ cient condition for this to take place is the following:
h (b; q) 2 o

1
ln (b)

I dub bettors with beliefs with all these characteristics and who seek to
maximize the expected growth rate of their wealth the doubly conservative
bettors.23
For these bettors there is an upper bound on how much they will risk, re-
gardles of how attractive the structure of bets o¤ered to the bettor may be.
Theorem 6 Consider an event that a doubly conservative bettor believes has a
prior probability of occurring equal to 1 . There is F 2 (0; 1)2 such that for no
structured bet R(f) the bettor will risk a total fraction of his wealth greater than
F on the outcome of this event.
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Proof. As rst step nd the least upper bound of G:
h b; 1
1 (h b;
2 )
G = sup
1
  
2
b 1  h b;

b1
2
!
:
I show that this supremum exists, and that
  
it is nite and greater to one, in
Appendix DC. Next, solve for F in
(1  F )G = 1:
To see that this F is the desired bound consider the following, so-called two-
part structured bet, R2 : you get to bet all you wish at odds b > 1 provided
you pay a xed fee T = tW > 0 beforehand. For f to be the optimal choice of
this bettor in this situation it has to be that
(W   tW   fW )(1 q) (W   qtW +R (f)W ) W
and
1  t+R (f) q
= b
1  t  f 1  q
and thus
(1  t  f)
 q
q
b 1
1  q


which requires
q
(1  f

q
) b

 1:
1  q
q q
Notice this is possible only if q b1 q is su¢ ciently high. Now, since
q b  1 q
is bounded from above by G

this m

eans that
 
1 1
(1  f) 
q
q

G
b1 q
and it follows that
 
1
f  1  = F:
G
I have shown that f > F cannot be implemented by using two-part structured
bets. It turns out that this completes the proof since it is a fact that if f
cannot be implemented by using two-part structured bets then it cannot be
implemented at all. I show that this is so in Appendix RP.
Example 1 Consider a logarithmic version of the beliefs that lead to fractional
Kelly:
1
ln q = c ln q + (1  c) ln
1 + b
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for c 2 (0; 1) ; q  1 and b  1  1:2 q A bettor who seeks to maximize the expected
growth rate of his wealth subject to these beliefs is a doubly conservative bettor
as dened above. For this bettor when q = 12 and c = :5 the bound described in
Theorem 6 is given by
F  0:19185240680033408;
which essentially means that this logarithmic fractional Kelly bettorwill never
risk more than one fth of his wealth on the outcome of a single event, no matter
how attractive the structured bet o¤ered.
The idea here, again, is not to defend this particular model of belief revision
and position sizing. I simply wish to point out the general features that a
belief system would have to have to break down the almost inescapable logic
underlying Proebstings paradox, and to present a specic example (in this case,
the logarithmic fractional Kelly criterion) that would implement those features.
8 Conclusions
In this paper I show that the implications of the paradox identied by Proebsting
and studied by Thorp and Brown run deeper than previously thought in that a
wide family of betting rules also su¤er from versions of the paradox. There is an
underlying logic to the method one uses to generate the paradoxes,one that
is dependent on the simple fact that any bettor who likes betting is willing to
pay money to face su¢ ciently attractive odds. Once one knows the criteria the
bettor uses for betting this willingness to pay can be determined exactly, and
the surplus the bettor derives from betting can be extracted from the bettor
through a structured bet with the following characteristics: o¤er attractive odds
on the condition that the bettor wagers certain amounts at less attractive odds.
If the bet is designed carefully all the bettors studied in this paper (except for
the so-called doubly conservative bettor) will, for better or for worse, willingly
give a large fraction of their wealth to the bookies. The situation is not unlike
that faced by a customer at a store that is o¤ered a steep discount on certain
items only after the customer commits to buying a certain number of those
items at the regularprice.
Having investigated how general the skimming results shown in this paper are
it is refreshing to know that, from a prescriptive point of view, one can develop
betting criteria that are conservative both with respect to taking excessive risk
and of being excessively optimistic, so that such a doubly conservative bettor
will never risk too large a fraction of his wealth on the outcome of a single event,
no matter how attractive the structure of odds presented to him.
That the array of structured bets like the ones discussed above can be de-
veloped and investigated has implications in other areas, like in the design of
securities, as the ideas employed in this paper could be used to create assets
that would be particularly attractive to certain types of investors. Alternatively,
they could be used to create the right incentives for individuals to save a given
14
portion of their wealth in retirement funds. More plainly, they can be used to
investigate the extent to which bookies in established betting markets already
skim bettors using similar kinds of ideas, and the extent to which the doubly
conservative criterion would protect a bettors wealth in these real life settings.
The scope of applicability of these ideas is even broader than this in the sense
that they may be of value for the analysis and structuring of products in any
type of market in which uncertainty plays a substantive role.
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10 Appendix CE: Skimming the general bettor
Consider bets of the form
R (r) =

I (r;W ) if r  r
I (rb;W ) + b (r   r) otherwise1 ,
with I (r;W ) implicitly dened by
bb
1 1
u(W   r) + u (W + I (r;W )) W
2
 u( );
2
u0 (W
b =
  r)
;
u0 (W + I (r;W + ))
and rb is the solution for r in
I (r;W ) = I (r;W + ) + b (r   r) ;
where  being small is used to guarantee that r > 0:
The problem for the bettor is then to
1 1
b
max u(W
2
  r) + u (W +R (r))
r 2
subject to R(r) as given above. Notice that R is not a fraction in this case.
Rather, it is measured in dollars. By construction, for r  r
1 1
u(W   r) + u (W +R (r)) = u(W )
2 2
b
and 1u(W   r) + 1u (W +R (r)) = u (W + ) > u(W ):2 2 This means that r = r
dominates any r  rb: Based on this the problem can now be recast as
1 1
max u(W   r) + u (W + I (r;W ) + b (r
r 2 2
  r)) :b b
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From the rst order conditions for the maximization of this function and the
denitions above one can derive the expression
u0 (W   r)
= b;
u0 (W + I (r;W + ) + b (r   r))
and since u
0(Wb =  r) r = ru0(W+I(r;W+)) it follows that
 .
11 Appendix FC: Skimming the fractional Kelly
bettor
Consider bets of the form
  1 q
(1 f) q 1 if f f
Rc (f) =
8<  
1
  :     q  q1 f
whe

+
b
solv
b bf   fb   1 otherwise
re b and q e

8<  qq b = e: 1 q 1 f (1)q = c + (1 c) 12

 
1+b
and fb is the solution for f in
(1  f)  1 qq =
To see that the system (1) has a
  q
1
    f   1 q e q + b f   f : (2)
solution insert the
 
second

bracketed equation
inside the rst and notice that as b approaches one from above the term q1 q
q
approaches one and hence

q b1 q

is close to one also. On the other hand, both 
q
q and q1 q are bounded from above as b gets larger, which means that
q b  1 q
grows without bound as

b grows, eventually becoming larger than

e : The
1 f

implication is that, by the intermediate value theorem, there is a value for b > 1
and q 2 1 ; 11+b 2 that satisfy both equations simultaneously.
To see that equation 2 has a solution notice that for f = f the left hand
side of 2 is smaller than the right hand side whereas for f = f q1 q the left hand
side is positive and the right hand side is zero. Then, by the intermediate value
theorem, there is a value for f = fbwhere equation 2 is satised. Again, f > 12
is used to guarantee that fb> 0 (and, again, a similar condition could have been
derived in terms of ):
The rest of the proof is identical to the ones above. For completeness, I
present details below.
The problem for the bettor is to
max (1  q) ln(W
f
  fW ) + q ln (W +R (f)W )
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subject to R(f) as given above. First lets show that the expected growth of
the bettors wealth when betting f is indeed  :
q
 
    1
 
  
  b q(1 q) ln(W fW ) + q ln W + 1 f + bf   fb  1W
1

  lnW
= (1  q) ln(1  f) + q ln
 q
1  f

but
b   q + bf   fb
   1 q 1
1  q
 q

fb + bf   fb =  1  f  q e q
and hence
(1  q) ln(1  f) + q ln

1 q
1  f   q e q

= :
Now notice that the expected growth rate
 
of the

bettors wealth for f  f is
zero:
1 
(1  qq) ln(W   fW ) + q ln

W +

(1  f)  q   1 W   lnW =
b
 q
(1  q) ln(1  1f) + q ln (1
 

  f)  q

= 0:
This means that f = f dominates any f  f: Based on this the problem can now
  1 q
be recast asmaxf (1  q) ln(W fW )+q ln
b
W +

1  qfb + bf   fb  1W
whic

;
h simplies to
1 q
max (1  q) ln(1  f) + q ln
 
1  f  q e q + b f
f
  f

From the rst order conditions for the maximization of this
 
function

and the
denitions above one can derive the expression    1 q
1  f q e q + b  f   f
(1  f)

q
= b;
(1  q)
and since  q
q e
b = ;
1  q

1  f
it follows that f is the desired solution for f .
12 Appendix DC: Finding G
Let M (b) = h
 
b; 12

ln(b) and notice that limb#1M (b) = 0. Also, note that the
assumption about the rate of convergence of h
 
b; 12

to zero implies that eventu-
ally h drops faster than ln(b) grows as b!1 and therefore limb M (b) = 0:!1
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This has the implication thatM (b) is bounded above by some numberM <1.
To see this note that for xed " > 0 there is b" such that, for b > b"; M (b) < ":
So the largest value for M happens for values of b to the left of b": Hence,
1 1
M = sup h

1
b;

ln (b)  sup h b; sup ln (b) = ln (b") < :
b<b" 2 b<b"

2


b<b" 2
1
( 1 )Now notice that
h b; 2
1 is positive, decreasing in b;and no greater than one.1 h(b; 2 )
1
Moreover, since h
  h
b;
 b;1 > 1 (for b > 12 1+b it follows that 2 ) b > 1 for b > 1.1 h(b; 12 )
This means that G > 1: To see that G <1 notice that
h b; 1
1 ( 2 )h b;
eM(b) = bh(b;
1
2 ) 
 
1 
 
2
h b;

b1
2
!
which means that G :
 
 eM <

1
13 Appendix RP: The generality of two part
structured bets
I seek to show that if you o¤er a doubly conservative bettor a structured bet R
and he risks a fraction f of his wealth on the outcome of the underlying event
then there exists a two-part structured bet R2 such that the bettor also chooses
f in this case. To construct R2 rst nd the value b that satises
1 +R (f) h
 
b; 1
= 2
1  f 1  h b;

b;
1
2
where b corresponds to the highest marginal
 
odd

s o¤ered as part of R. Now
nd the smallest value b that satises
h
 
b; 12

h b; 1
b =
1  h b; 12
 
2
1  h b;

b:
1
2
Notice that b always exists, sin
 
ce h

is onto and
  
h
1 
 
b; 12
h
 
b; 12
 hb   b; 12 b ;  h   1 b;

1
2
which implies that 1 < b  b: Now given such b nd

the value of t that solves
1  t+ bf h
 
b; 1
= 2
1  t  f 1  h b;

b:1
2
By construction, the two part structured bet d
 
ened

by the pair (t; b) with the
interpretation pay tW for the right to bet as much money as you wish at odds
bis such that the bettor picks f = f:
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Notes
1To do this it turned out to be useful to understand that the fractional Kelly
bettor is someone who also seeks to maximize the expected growth rate of his
wealth, with beliefs over winning that are more pessimistic than the beliefs of
an ordinary Kelly investor. Specically, they are a weighted average of the
investors prior beliefs and the beliefs implied by the odds that are being o¤ered
to the bettor.
2In particular, all those based on expected utilty maximization.
3Skimming as used in the paper is a variant on practices known as price
discriminationin the economics literature.
4Half openbecause the bettors can still be skimmed, just not completely.
5In particular on results from consumer theory regarding the income and
substitution e¤ects of a price change, the compensating variation of a price
changeand price discrimination.
6This section is based on the account of Proebstings Paradox given in [1]
and [2].
7and a lower expected nal value of your wealth.
8Although quite obvious, it will be important in what follows to stress that
fC is the fraction of the individuals original wealth that the Kelly bettor will
ultimately bet in Situation C.
9In general, if a bettor makes the Kelly bet on a 50=50 bet with a payout of
bA, and then is o¤ered bB > bA; the bettor will, in this situation, bet a total of
fC = fB + fA
(bB   bA)
;
2bB
where f i is the Kelly bet for situation i. From this one can tell that fC > fB .
10In general, to nd the cash value of the bet ( w1; w2) when the (market)
odds are b to 1 on state 2 one simply computes the expression
b 1
v = (
1 + b
 w1) + w2:
1 + b
What one is doing is expressing the value of the bundle ( w1; w2) in units of
the risk free asset, which is the bundle (1; 1). In this example, with b = 5,
w1 = :25W and w2 = :5W one gets v =  :125W .
11To see this notice thatWC =W+v with v = bB  fAW + 1 b AAf W1+bB 1+b
as in the previous endnote. The result quickly follows.
B
  
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12In economics terminology: x1 and x2 are normal goods.
13The increase in expected growth rate from betting an extra dollar when the
individual is keeping x1 in cash and has wealth levelW is given by
1 b
2 W (1+b) bx1
1 1
 
:2 x It is easy to see that this expression is positive since, by construction,1
1 b = 1 1 > W2 W (1 b) bx and W+ .1 2 x1
  14This expression follows from the fact that C W xf =   C1W and that xC1 =
1  fB WC .
15The Kelly rule f = b 1 u2b is a special case from this class for (x) = ln(x).
In general, fu (W; b) need not be independent of W .
16Apply the implicit function theorem to the rst order conditions for maxi-
b
mization of
u1u(x ) + 1u (x ) to get @x = 221 1+b1 22 2 @W 21 b ; which is greater
2 u11+ 2 u22(1+b) (1+b)
than zero since u11; u22 < 0:
17This conclusion could have also been reached by noticing that now b = 4:625;
WC = :9375W and by using the expression
fC
WC
= fB +
W

WC
1 
W

= :9375 :2 + (1  :9375) = :25
18A fact known in the economics literature as the compensated law of demand.
19Anyone that has been o¤ered a deal buy one, get one at half the priceat
a store has been exposed to practices like this. Practices like this are known as
price discrimination in the economics literature.
20And it should be clear from the presentation that the Kelly skimming result
can be recast in terms of certainty equivalents since a Kelly bettor whose wealth
is expected to grow at the rate  will have no problem trading his portfolio of
bets for an amout of cash which is exactly equal to We:
21Marginal with respect to the bettors dollar amount of betting. That is, if
he is o¤ered the non-linear bet R (f) so that he stands to gain R(f)W when
betting fW , the marginal odds equal the derivative of R(f)W with respect to
fW , which is simply R0(f).
22Notice that h need not be continuous in either of its arguments.
23Conservative both in his attitudes towards capital preservation and in his
process of belief revision.
20
